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C ybercrime is a term associated with activities relating to the 
misuse of data, computers, infor-
mation systems, and cyberspace for 
economic, personal, or psychologi-
cal gain. However, there’s no author-
itative deinition or description of 
what cybercrime actually means, 
nor a comprehensive description of 
its traits.
To better understand the 
meaning of cybercrime, we pro-
pose the creation of a coherent 
model and taxonomy, starting 
with the stakeholders involved: 
attackers, defenders, and victims. 
Delving deeply into stakeholders’ 
motives, cost models, tools, and 
techniques will provide a clearer 
picture of how humans inter-
act with technology in the com-
plex context of cybercrime. This 
improved understanding of cyber-
crime would contribute to better 
measures and awareness to pre-
vent and combat cybercrime. 
he hreat of Cybercrime
A July 2014 McAfee report states 
that the amount of global annual 
losses due to cybercrime is an esti-
mated US$400 billion, with a con-
servative estimate of $375 billion 
and a potential maximum of $575 
billion.1 Although these igures 
could be seen as tremendously huge 
losses, the actual igures are hard to 
accurately pin down, even with the 
best intentions. Some argue that 
the cost of cybercrime is exagger-
ated and oten biased. For example, 
Ross Anderson and his colleagues 
stated that these igures might be 
intentionally over-reported and 
that the cost of defending against 
cybercrime (by purchasing protec-
tion sotware or patching afected 
systems) is disproportionately 
bigger than the revenue generated 
by the perpetrators.2 
Figures on cybercrime loss are 
usually based on data obtained 
through surveys, but survey sci-
ence is di cult.3 First, a representa-
tive sample of the population might 
not provide a representative sample 
of the losses. his is because losses 
tend to be extremely concentrated, 
with uneven distribution across the 
population. Second, cybercrime 
surveys are prone to be distorted 
by outliers. Even a single outlier—
perhaps due to a lie, transcription 
mistake, or exaggeration—can lead 
to catastrophic error. Finally, cyber-
crime is afected by “surveying rare 
phenomena” risks. For example, a 
majority of those surveyed might 
not be afected, while those who 
are afected report igures at much 
higher or lower rates.
In addition, there’s no authorita-
tive source for calculating the exact 
amount of losses, and the amount 
cited is based on reported cases. 
Most cybercrime incidents go unre-
ported, as many victims are reluc-
tant to admit they were victimized 
or might not even realize they were 
atacked.3 Although the exact num-
ber of losses caused by cybercrime 
is arguable, the fact that cybercrime 
is a rising threat is undeniable.
What Is Cybercrime?
Cybercrime is the combination 
of crime and cyberspace. Crime 
implies a behavior—performed by 
a perpetrator or an atacker—that 
is considered harmful and therefore 
has a potential cost to individuals or 
society.4 In addition to monetary 
losses, cybercrime’s efects can be 
physical (a building is demolished 
or a person is injured), social (a 
person is shunned by society), or 
psychological (a person experi-
ences depression, frustration, and 
anxiety). he crime might violate 
existing law (national or interna­
tional agreements and charters) or 
might lie outside a clear jurisdiction 
(for example, international coercion 
cases with botnets).
he cyberspace component 
implies that there’s always a cyber 
element, meaning that the crime is 
perpetrated over the Internet. Still, 
this classiication isn’t complete: 
cyberspace might be the medium 
for the crime, or it might be used 
by the perpetrator to gain more 
scalability. Graeme R. Newman 
describes cybercrime as a behav­
ior in which “computers or net­
works are a tool, a target, or a place 
of criminal activity.”5 In addition, 
David S. Wall classiies cybercrime 
as crimes in the machine (computer 
content), crimes using machines 
(computer related), and crimes 
against the machine (computer 
integrity).6 here’s also the distinc­
tion of whether the crime is com­
puter enabled (an extension of a 
traditional crime, made more scal­
able by technology) or computer 
dependent (the crime couldn’t exist 
without technology).
Cybercrime might reach great 
scalability, meaning that it afects 
not only individuals but also groups 
and organizations, or even society 
as a whole. he crime might also be 
conined to a certain place or spread 
nationally or internationally. 
Having a clear understanding of 
cybercrime from an individual to a 
societal level involves identifying 
and comprehending cybercrime 
stakeholders, who are classiied 
according to their role in cybercrime 
incidents. hese include atackers, 
defenders, and victims. Other stake­
holders, such as middlemen or sys­
tem operators, are beyond the scope 
of this article.
he atacker represents a crime’s 
perpetrators; multiple atackers 
might act in collusion. he defender 
represents law enforcement agen­
cies and security researchers who 
atempt to understand and prevent 
crime, develop protection mecha­
nisms and countermeasures, and 
collect evidence or prepare for a 
court case. he victim (intended 
or otherwise) represents the target 
of cybercrime. Victims might or 
might not realize that they’ve been 
victimized, and the crime’s impact 
varies considerably from embarrass­
ment or inancial loss to a national 
security breach or even loss of life. 
Figure 1 illustrates how cybercrime 




Atackers are usually motivated by 
political or inancial gain, or human 
factors such as revenge or curiosity. 
Atackers range from hobbyist and 
professional hackers to angry work­
ers and jealous spouses to organized 
crime groups, political activists, or 
even spies.
here’s a subtle diference 
between cyberatack and cyber­
exploitation.7 Although both might 
employ similar techniques to pen­
etrate their target’s defenses, the 
outcomes difer. Cyberatacks aim 
to harm or damage the target, for 
example, by corrupting important 
data or causing a denial of service. 
Cyberexploitation, on the other 
hand, aims to extract information 
surreptitiously, as in cyberespionage. 
Nevertheless, the impact of cyber­
exploitation could be severe, ranging 
from economic losses, such as sto­
len trade secrets or business plans, 
Figure 1. Cybercrime stakeholder interactions. A computer or network typically 
sits between an attacker and a victim, and—where applicable—a defender, 
representing the “cyber” element of cybercrime. Victims might have some assets 
that attackers are attracted to, but this isn’t always the case. Defenders could be 
seen as entities associated with the entry point of an attack but might interact 
directly with victims and attackers in a noncyber environment (for example, a 
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to threats against national security, 
such as leaking military information. 
Both cyberexploitation and cyberat­
tack can be carried out on the same 
target by the same perpetrator, but 
that’s not always the case.
Atackers’ behavior can be char-
acterized by some objective (mali-
cious or benign), intent (deliberate 
or accidental), and capability. More 
oten than not, cybercrime inci-
dents are considered malicious 
(and thereby deliberate), where the 
atacker has a motive and even a 
business model or strategy to capi-
talize on the crime.
To get a clearer picture of atack-
ers, we must dig deeper into their 
characteristics, addressing the 
“what” (atacking threats, breach 
levels, and target objectives), “why” 
(objectives and motives), and “how” 
(atacking tools, vulnerability identi-
ication, and atacking methods).
Attacking hreats
We identiied ive factors related 
to atacking threats, or the kinds of 
activities—illegal or otherwise—
that atackers might perform. he 
most widely noted atacking threat 
is computer intrusion, which is any 
malicious activity directed at a com-
puter system or the services it pro-
vides, typically allowing an atacker 
some level of control of the tar-
get system. Examples of computer 
intrusion include hacking, bots, 
worms, viruses, spyware, and mal-
ware. Computer intrusion might 
also serve as a stepping stone for 
mounting other kinds of atacks and 
for covering the atacker’s tracks. 
For instance, an atacker might take 
over a legitimate computer network 
and storage devices for distributing 
illegal materials, while keeping his 
or her own IP address hidden. 
Another common atacking 
threat is online fraud, which is 
wrongful or criminal deception 
intended to result in inancial or per-
sonal gain. Examples include inan-
cial fraud (email scams, phishing, 
and online credit card fraud) and 
identity thet. he term “online 
fraud” oten encompasses both 
inancial fraud and identity thet.
Copyright infringement occurs 
when someone other than the 
copyright holder uses a work with-
out the owner’s authorization. 
Examples include sotware piracy, 
illegal downloading of music or 
video without authorization, and 
copyright violation. his is oten 
perceived as a minor threat, perhaps 
because the victim is oten a big 
corporation or a wealthy celebrity. 
As such, it’s frequently overlooked, 
and has even become acceptable to 
some. Moreover, not all copyright 
infringement claims turn out to be 
substantive in the end. he copy-
right holders might retract their 
claim due to the costs of pursuing 
a legal case, the di culty in prov-
ing their case, or a change of heart. 
Nonetheless, copyright infringe-
ment is still a crime, and various 
organizations such as the Recording 
Industry Association of America are 
trying to address the problem by 
chasing the biggest ofenders.
With the increased popularity of 
social media and social networking 
sites, the serious threats of cyber-
stalking and cyberbullying have 
emerged. Cyberbullying oten starts 
with cyberstalking and escalates 
with a more focused atack directed 
at the intended victim. he popular-
ity of online gaming and its social 
elements (for example, the ability to 
talk to or about your opponents in 
massive online role-playing games) 
has opened up a new type of cyber-
bullying, in which players harass 
and gang up on each other. he 
consequences of these atacks can 
be very harmful and even fatal, with 
reports of teenagers commiting 
suicide ater being bullied online.8 
A recent study by the Pew Research 
Internet Project indicates the preva-
lence of online harassment among 
US Internet users, with 40 percent 
of respondents having experienced 
online harassment (ranging from 
name-calling to being stalked), and 
73 percent having witnessed others 
being subjected to it.9
Finally, there’s the publica-
tion and sharing of illegal material 
online, such as inappropriate images 
of minors and items related to hate 
crimes and terrorist threats. he 
impact of these threats can be very 
tangible (for example, a person’s 
life could be ruined or even ended) 
and wide reaching (a terrorist atack 
could maim and kill many inno-
cent bystanders). However, cross- 
jurisdiction issues remain, as what is 
illegal in one country might be legal 
in others. For instance, it’s against 
the law to sell Nazi memorabilia in 
France, but it’s legal in the US. his 
is a complex mater that requires 
multiple perspectives to address.
Breach Levels
Breach levels relate to the extent of 
the impact caused by the atacker. 
his is associated closely with the 
CIA principle of security model: 
conidentiality (only authorized 
people are able to access the infor-
mation), integrity (the information 
is accurate and can’t be modiied 
in an unauthorized manner), and 
availability (the information or ser-
vice is available when needed). 
An atack could breach the con-
identiality of a victim’s data, such 
as a person’s bank details or a com-
pany’s intellectual property. he 
original owner still has the data but 
could become a victim of inancial 
or identity fraud or—as in cyber-
exploitation—might lose a compet-
itive advantage. he breach could 
also afect national security.
On another level, the integ-
rity of a victim’s information could 
be compromised. In this case, the 
atacker tampers with the accuracy 
and representation of the origi-
nal data by adding, modifying, or 
deleting pieces of information. For 
example, the atacker might alter 
someone’s credit rating, which 
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could lead to that person’s inability 
to secure a inancial loan.
he third breach level doesn’t 
involve a victim’s data directly, but 
rather its availability. In this case, 
an atacker prevents the authorized 
user from accessing his or her user 
account, data, or other information.
he most recent estimate of the 
average cost of a data breach to a 
company (based on the Ponemon 
Institute’s research involving 10 
countries) is $3.5 million, a 15 
percent increase from 2013.10 he 
same report also identiies three 
main causes of a data breach: mali-
cious or criminal atack, system 
glitch, and human error. Malicious 
or criminal atacks involve negligent 
insiders—employees or contrac-
tors who inadvertently cause a data 
breach through carelessness—and 
malicious insiders, who intention-
ally cause the breach.
It’s an unfortunate percep-
tion that many, if not most, data 
thet incidents were commited 
by trusted individuals who were 
given access to the information.11 
Employees or contractors could 
be inluenced—through inancial 
rewards or blackmail, or even as a 
result of an ideological change—to 
steal valuable information and pass 
it on to a third party.
In addition to inancial loss and 
compromise of national security, 
other efects of data breach include 
damaged reputations and the loss 
of customer loyalty and trust. In the 
atermath of such a breach, afected 
parties (typically the employer and 
ailiated individuals or organiza-
tions) must work to rebuild their 
brand and image. 
Target Objectives
Target objectives straddle the “what” 
and “why” of cybercrime. An atack-
er’s target could be categorized into 
the following main groups:
 ■ personal accounts: computer 
login, email accounts, social 
networking accounts, and 
bank accounts, which could be 
exploited for direct atack, such 
as inancial fraud, or as a stepping 
stone for a more elaborate atack, 
such as phishing;
 ■ data: credit card details, bank 
account numbers, customer data-
bases, transaction details, and pri-
vate information such as email 
conversations, text messages, 
phone calls, and merger infor-
mation and company account 
details, which atackers could sell 
to a third party;
 ■ resources: system, computer, or 
network resources an atacker 
could use to commit illegal activi-
ties or to mount further atacks; 
 ■ component: taking control of 
computer, network, and mobile 
devices—oten related to physi-
cal atacks in which the compo-
nent provides an entry point for 
the atack (for example, disabling 
a car’s alarm system before steal-
ing it); and
 ■ human factors: triggering the vic-
tim’s emotions, such as anger, 
jealousy, or fear, or fulilling the 
atacker’s own emotional desires, 
including curiosity, revenge, or 
reputation.
het of intellectual property 
(IP) is a growing concern among 
organizations, especially in phar-
maceutical drug manufactur-
ing and the automotive and ilm 
industries. hese industries have 
spent large amounts of money 
and resources in the research and 
development of their products, so 
it’s understandable that they want 
to protect their competitive advan-
tage. Meanwhile, rivals are keen 
to get their hands on certain IP to 
reap its beneits without having to 
spend the capital typically associ-
ated with such an endeavor. his 
could lead to illegal tactics such as 
espionage and thet. On the other 
hand, anti-copyright campaigners 
argue that robust protection of IP 
rights could lead to a monopoly by 
the IP holder, which might hamper 
creativity and progress. 
Motives
In conjunction with the target 
objectives, there are many reasons 
behind atacks. An atacker might be 
inancially motivated, either stealing 
money directly from the target or 
atempting to obtain valuable infor-
mation about competitors, which 
could beneit the atacker directly 
or be sold to interested third parties.
In some cases, the atacker is 
motivated by political or reputa-
tional gain: he or she wants to obtain 
an advantage over a rival by gaining 
access to campaign plans or even 
carrying out a smear campaign.
Another motive is emotional 
gain. he atacker might want to feel 
some form of accomplishment, such 
as taking pride in being able to break 
into a secure system, or to exploit the 
victim’s feelings through bullying. 
Tools
From an atacker’s viewpoint, a 
tool is an instrument for exploit-
ing a computer or network’s vul-
nerabilities. Simple atacking tools 
can include information exchange 
sites, user commands, or even 
physical access to the target device. 
he simplest tool is an informa-
tion exchange portal, which allows 
potential atackers to share insights, 
techniques, and learning resources 
through published articles or Inter-
net forums. However, some tools are 
very sophisticated, such as Trojan 
horse programs, computer viruses, 
or distributed tools (botnets).
Vulnerability scanners represent 
a suite of tools that could be used 
to identify a system’s weaknesses 
before launching a full-blown atack 
against it. hese tools are useful 
because they allow atackers to min-
imize wasted efort on hard-to-crack 
systems by irst exploiting targets 
with obvious vulnerabilities. Exam-
ples include host discovery, port 
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scanning, operating system detec­
tion, service discovery, authen­
tication tools, and vulnerability 
assessment tools.
An atacker might also utilize spe-
ciic hacking tools, which are mainly 
used to exploit the weaknesses 
detected by vulnerability scanners. 
he hacking tool is equipped with 
more powerful, oten customiz-
able features that let the atacker 
gain access to or control the target 
system. Examples of hacking tools 
include exploit kits, password crack-
ers, rootkit tools, wireless hacking 
tools, and packet-crating tools.
Atackers tend to use proxies to 
hide their electronic trails. By hop-
ping through several intermediate 
proxies, such as compromised com-
puters or networks, atackers make 
it di cult for investigators to trace 
the atack back to them. Anonymiz-
ing services such as Tor can also be 
used for this purpose. hese prox-
ies can speed up access to resources 
and multiply an atack’s magnitude.
Vulnerability Identification
A system’s vulnerability is a weak-
ness that lets atackers gain entry 
to the system. Design vulnerability 
is inherent to the system’s design 
or speciication, where even a per-
fect implementation will result in 
a vulnerability or design law. For 
example, bufer overlow is an oten-
exploited design law.
On the other hand, implemen-
tation vulnerability is caused by an 
error in the sotware or hardware 
implementation of a satisfactory 
design. For example, the incom-
patibility of a platform makes it 
vulnerable to atack. Coniguration 
vulnerability is the result of an error 
or oversight in the coniguration 
stage, for example, using default 
passwords for system accounts, giv-
ing “world write” permission for 
new iles, or enabling vulnerable 
services by default.
Atackers will try to iden-
tify these three generic classes of 
vulnerability, exploiting one or 
more of them to enter a system. 
Methods
Atacking methods represent the 
manifestation of the atack and are 
oten the irst symptoms that alert 
defenders or victims to the atack. 
Defensive mechanisms, such as 
intrusion detection systems, could 
detect early-stage atacking meth-
ods such as probe and scan, which 
atempt to gather information about 
a target to determine its character-
istics, protection mechanisms, and 
vulnerabilities, which could lead 
to further atack. Other network 
monitoring tools deployed by the 
defender or victim could also detect 
looding atempts, which are geared 
toward swamping the target with 
bad data to overload its capacity.
Most systems require user 
authentication before allowing 
access. An atacker might try to dis-
cover a legitimate user’s authentica-
tion credentials to gain access, for 
example, by exploiting weak pass-
words or using brute force to guess or 
crack passwords. Social engineering, 
in which an atacker uses psychologi-
cal manipulation (for example, pre-
tending to be an authority igure or 
taking advantage of a victim’s eager-
ness to please), could prove to be an 
efective technique for gaining access 
without technical skills or tools. Fur-
thermore, an atacker might even try 
to bypass the authentication process 
by exploiting a system’s vulnerability, 
such as a coniguration vulnerability 
that leaves the password blank or a 
design vulnerability that causes buf-
fer overlow and presents the con-
sole to the atacker. Another popular 
method involves spooing: assuming 
the appearance of a diferent entity 
in network communications or ser-
vices to persuade or trick the victim 
into revealing valuable information 
such as his or her password.
Once allowed entry, an atacker 
could perform read method, obtain-
ing information from a storage 
device or other medium without 
making a copy of it; copy method, 
reproducing the information while 
leaving the original information 
unchanged; modify method, chang-
ing the contents or characteristics of 
a piece of information that could be 
detrimental to the owner; or even 
delete method, removing informa-
tion or making the information irre-
trievable. All of these would afect 
victims to varying degrees, but oten 
victims aren’t aware of the breach 
until they’re locked out of their own 
system or they notice some of their 
information is missing.
Figure 2 summarizes the char-
acteristics of atackers, providing 
some insight into the “what,” “why,” 
and “how” of atacks.
T he biggest challenge in under-standing cybercrime relates to 
the massive landscape involved, mak-
ing it impossible to encompass every-
thing. So, it’s important to limit the 
scope by providing a comprehensive 
view of cybercrime from a speciic 
perspective (the stakeholder’s point 
of view in this article) before atempt-
ing to construct the big picture.
Cybercrime poses an asymmet-
rical challenge. he potential return 
for cybercriminals is high, with 
relatively low risks. On the other 
hand, the cost of protecting cyber-
assets could be disproportionately 
large. For example, a cybercrime 
ecosystem defender will need to 
close all possible holes to minimize 
the risk of being atacked. Mean-
while, an atacker only needs to ind 
one hole to exploit it. In addition, 
cybercrime literature tends to pro-
vide more detail from the atacker’s 
viewpoint than from the defender’s 
or victim’s. For example, it’s easier 
to ind information on how atack-
ers plan their exploit, the tools 
that were used, and the impact of 
the atack than it is to learn about 
defenders’ eforts and assets. his 
perpetuates the stereotype that 
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atackers are smart people who 
exploit the limited skills or even the 
naivety of the defenders or victims. 
All of these aspects make it diicult 
to generate a balanced perspective 
on cybercrime.
he second part of this article, 
which will be published in the 
March/April issue of IEEE Secu-
rity & Privacy, will analyze the vic-
tims’ and defenders’ roles in detail 
as well as lessons learned. We hope 
this series will provide an informa-
tive overview for understanding 
cybercrime, which in turn will raise 
cybercrime awareness and help 
combat cybercrime in a meaningful 
and practical manner. 
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Figure 2. Attacker characteristics. here is a range of threats associated with attackers, who have reasons, tools, and techniques for conducting 
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